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In his works Chora [Derrida, Jacques. 1993. Khôra. Paris: Galilée] and “Comment ne pas parler? 
Denegations” Derrida used the metaphor chora from Plato’s Timaeus (49a and following) to 
continue his struggle with the metaphysics of presence. In 1926 Nishida,  the founder of the 
Japanese Kyōto School, used the same metaphor to create a new foundation of philosophy. 
Nishitani, a disciple of Nishida, developed the work of Nishida in close connection to Zen 
Buddhist experiences. Derrida tries to show the limits of language within the game of language, 
whereas Nishitani starts from an experience beyond language, but tries to make it clear in the 
game of language. Derrida tries to destroy the limits of Western thinking within the dimension 
of language, whereas Nishitani tries to open up the Zen Buddhist tradition for philosophy. Both 
try to open up a new dimension of thinking which is not bound to substantialized truth.  
 
Keywords: Philosophy of place, use of language in philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, Japanese 
philosophy 
 
Derrida’s Use of Language in Philosophy 
The title of a lecture by Derrida is “Comment ne pas Parler?” (“How not to Speak?”).1 If one thinks 
about the meaning of this question it immediately appears ambiguous. Does it mean a mere negation 
or rejection of speaking? Or is in fact the positive emphasis, in the sense of How could I not speak? 
what is meant here, that is, that speaking should not be avoided, in fact it is downright necessary to 
speak? Or does the question show the how of non-speaking, the way how non-speaking can take 
place? The play of differences is opened with this question, and the puzzling changing around of 
meanings becomes an element of thinking. 
According to Derrida it is exactly this play of differences that is about the “disruption of presence” 
(Derrida 2001, 369). It is about a disruption, or formulated more carefully, about a shattering of 
presence. Presence indicates the substantial foundation of all representation, which traditionally takes 
place in signs. After the classical model, the sign is the representation or image of an unchangeable or 
constant essence. As the framework of all speech in the form of substance ontology, this model is to 
be disrupted or shattered. With regard to this framework we are talking about the presence-thinking 
and representational thinking that has to a large extent determined European philosophy, and which 
Heidegger identified in more detail as a “vorstellendes Denken.”2 Consequently Derrida is not talking 
about just any framework, but about the framework in which the dominant form of the history of 
European philosophy unfolded. 
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By initiating a destruction of the sign, of consciousness, and with that, of the entire linguistic 
discourse, Derrida attempts to stir up the veiled and concealed strata of thought:  
Also the destruction of discourse is not simply an erasing neutralization. It multiplies words, 
precipitates them one against the other, engulfs them too, in an endless and baseless substitution 
whose only rule is the sovereign affirmation of the play outside meaning. … But the rule of the game 
or, rather, the game as rule has been affirmed; as has been the necessity of transgressing … discourse. 
(Derrida 2001, 347) 
Aside from the criticism of logocentrism, the criticism of ethnocentrism (that is the fixation on a 
single culture or a single cultural sphere) also plays a large role for Derrida in the destruction of 
metaphysics.  
One can say with total security that there is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the critique of 
ethnocentrism – the very condition for ethnology – should be systematically and historically 
contemporaneous with the destruction of the history of metaphysics. Both belong to one and the same 
era. (Derrida 2001, 356) 
The point of the criticism of logocentrism and ethnocentrism for Derrida is to show the limitations of 
our own cultural tradition, in order to break that tradition open. His work and thinking are directed 
against substantializing, that is, against all solidification. “Presence” is thus another word for 
substantializing. According to Derrida the thinking of presence is an essential feature of Western 
philosophy. Simultaneously however, in this tradition of thought one finds in many places a 
secondary current which cannot easily be fitted into the tradition of the thinking of presence and thus 
promises another entrance into thought. 
In deconstruction Derrida takes on the task of bringing out the “other,” that which does not serve 
presence and substantializing, in those various places where it actually already “wrote itself between 
the lines” (Derrida 1976, 86). His way of dealing with texts can thus not be rigid, because that would 
be a performative contradiction. It is exactly in the play of differences that Derrida tries to set the 
ingrown and solidified representations of key concepts in motion. He thereby positions himself 
against the tradition of conceptual thought, as he does not define concepts in working through a text, 
but marks word-traces, whereby the actual activity of the playful argumentation is more important 
than the identification of a conclusion. Hereby he shows a way of philosophizing that is not concerned 
with the determination of truth in the sense of a never-changing universal substance, but with the pure 
movement of difference in free play. Where Derrida brings out the “other” in this way in various 
places as the differing and thereby moving, this has a double meaning: on the one hand he shows, in 
the way of the playful argumentation, the disruption of all identification; on the other, through his 
playing he puts the worked-through text into play in a new manner. Truth is thus connected more to 
the free movement of language than to the power of definition by concepts. 
Aside from the word-trace play, which is supposed to bring out the inapparent (das Unscheinbare) of 
play in playing, Derrida constantly finds new traces that attempt to exhibit what is in fact not 
identifiable in language: différance, trace, and in following up Plato, he speaks of place (χώρα, lieu),3 
which in our context is particularly important. He interprets the theme of place beginning from Plato’s 
dialogue Timaeus. This theme, which only surfaces briefly in the Timaeus, has only been taken up in 
the European tradition in the twentieth century, maybe exactly because it expresses an unorthodox 
idea that goes against the mainstream of metaphysical thought. 
Plato (2005) distinguishes in Timaeus 49a between an ontological ground constitution of “the form of 
an example”4 and a “reproduction of an example,”5 and adds that his distinction is no longer 
sufficient. A “third genus”6 must be introduced to complement the first two. Plato then inquires into 
the force of such a “third genus” and says that it is “the receptacle, and as it were the nurse, of all 
Becoming.”7 It is that “in which respectively emerging each of them (things) arrives and from which 
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it departs again” (50a). “It certainly does not emerge from out of its own essence itself. But it always 
receives everything and absolutely never has in any way a similar shape to the emerging” (50b). “So 
we have to think three genera: (1) that which becomes, (2) that into which it becomes/forms, and (3) 
that, reproduced from which the becoming thing is born.”8 Thus it is “free from all forms” (50d). 
Plato calls it “invisible and unshaped, all-receptive, and in some most perplexing and most baffling 
way partaking of the intelligible” (51a). This “third genus” Plato calls “χώρα,” that which “always 
being, never passing, grants a place to everything that includes emerging, itself without sense 
perception yet graspable through a certain, hardly reliable, bastardly thinking” (52b). This idea arises 
with Plato only briefly and does not resurface again in his work. 
Within the Western history of philosophy this thought has only been included since the twentieth 
century, in a few places.9 Specific mention should be made of Heidegger, who in his interpretation of 
chora,10 traced a direct line to East Asia. Heidegger writes:  
In the verb χωρίζειν lies ή χώρα, ό χώρος; we translate: the neighborhood, the neighboring 
surroundings that grants and allows staying. The nouns χώρα, χώρος go back to χάω (wherefrom 
χάος), yawn, gape, arising, opening; ή χώρα as the neighboring surroundings is then “region.” 
Thereby we understand the open range and the expanse wherein something takes up its stay, from 
where it comes, escapes and counters. (Heidegger 1994, 335) 
This interpretation of chora hits upon a pivotal thought in the later Heidegger that again particularly 
appeals to Asians.11 This Heideggerian interpretation could also have inspired Derrida, and it 
corroborates the virulence of this idea with respect to the dialogue between Eastern and Western 
thought. 
The word-trace place points to something that neither is nor is not, but belongs to what Plato calls that 
“third kind.” Derrida takes up this idea and tries to elucidate his own play with it:  
The bold stroke consists here in going back behind and below the origin, or also the birth, toward a 
necessity which is neither generative nor engendered and which carries philosophy, “precedes” (prior 
to the time that passes or the eternal time before history) and “receives” the effect. … (Derrida 1995, 
126). 
It is not the question of a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the 
content, of the pure movement which produces difference. The (pure) trace is differance [différance]. 
(Derrida 1976, 62, italics in original) 
Place appears in the pure movement, which first lets difference appear. In pure movement, word-
traces are left that do not represent the real in any substantial way, but that would show the place of 
difference, both in content, that is in the play of meanings within the text, as well as formally, that is 
in the way of the argumentation. 
In recent years, Derrida has been increasingly connected to East Asian thought. At first glance, with a 
view to Derrida’s regular themes, this affinity is not expected; furthermore, no direct engagement of 
Derrida with East Asian thought is available. To establish a preliminary connection here, we can point 
to the following: in his works Chora and “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida discovered the 
idea of chora as word-trace from the Platonic tradition. This idea had already been utilized as a 
suggestion to develop a logic of place (basho no ronri) in 1926 by Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945),12 the 
father of modern Japanese philosophy. The idea of place is the decisive turning point in Nishida’s 
philosophy and thus very important for the foundation of an East Asian philosophy. Derrida also takes 
the idea up and arrives in his interpretation of chora – but not just there – into a peculiar proximity to 




Nishitani’s Use of Language in Philosophy 
The logic of place, typified by Nishida’s pupil Nishitani as epoch-making, is of great significance for 
the development of a characteristically East Asian philosophy. Nishitani, who studied with Heidegger, 
further develops the idea in different phases of his thought and brings it (among others) into a 
dialogue with the philosophy of Hegel. This dialogue is understood in extension of Heidegger as a 
destruction of the Western European metaphysical tradition. Nishitani’s attempt at a destruction of 
metaphysics is however – in distinction to Derrida – based on a foundational East Asian experience 
and the attempt to philosophically verbalize this experience. Derrida is also concerned with the 
destruction of metaphysics, whereby he attempts to assert hitherto neglected or forgotten themes in 
European thought against the tradition of metaphysics of unchanging substance. Accordingly, one line 
extends from Heidegger to Japan, with the attempt to deconstruct European thought from a logic of 
place, with regards to its hidden strata; another line, which admittedly circumscribes deconstruction, 
but nevertheless further follows the inner motives of the destruction of metaphysics, extends to 
France. Both Nishitani and Derrida are concerned with criticizing the dominant tradition of European 
thought and the place of thinking and truth within this tradition. 
To present the philosophy of place in Nishitani briefly, I particularly look at one text in which 
Nishitani attempts a dialogue with Hegel. In this piece, titled “Hannya to risei” or “Prajñā und 
Vernunft,” he respectively focuses on an Eastern and a Western foundational word for thinking 
(Nishitani 1988, Bd. 13, 31–95). Nishitani chooses Hegel as point of departure for his argumentation, 
since Hegel is considered the culmination of European metaphysics. In his argumentation, Nishitani 
seeks to expose and criticize Hegel’s “place” from his own East Asian “place.” 
In his later works, Nishitani often starts from an expression or a kōan from the Zen Buddhist tradition. 
The earlier mentioned text also begins with a kōan: “Holding up a flower – a tiny smile.”13 Following 
this kōan, Nishitani inquires into the place of the mentioned occurrence and tries to verbalize how in 
holding up the flower the world appears. In the minute event of holding up a flower and a tiny smile, 
the level of the fundamental and general (li, 理) appears as something that is only real in its living 
actualization. In this the timelessness in the sense of the foundational proves itself to lie not in 
formalization, but rather in the highest concretization involving a small deed.  
In the event of the holding up of a flower there is revealed – in this “there-place” (genjō, 現場) and in 
this “there-time” (genji, 現時) – the dharmadhātu of the principle (rihō, 理法) itself as a fact/reality 
(jijitsu, 事実); it is the “happening” (genki, 現起) of this truth in this world. Furthermore, in the 
simultaneous accordance of the holding up of a flower it is the happening emerging (genki) of a new 
world (atarashiku sekai), that is, it is the emerging in the “there” of time and place (tokoro, 處) of 
world. (Nishitani 1988, Bd. 13, 34 and following) 
The grasping of truth in the most formalized way within logic – which in Hegel takes the form of a 
concrete logic – is to a certain extent reversed in the holding up of a flower and becomes realized in 
the flesh in a concrete action.  
In the teachings of Buddhism, one generally calls the occurrence in which the dharmadhātu of the 
principle appears as a (concrete) happening “the occurring of the apposite action” (ki, 機). The 
emerging in the “there” of world in the first place is the arising of the occurrence of the apposite 
action in this place as the absolute whole and is therefore the appearing of the all- encompassing 
occurring apposite action in “there” (zenkigen, 全機現). (Nishitani 1988, Bd. 13, 35) 
From this place, which he qualifies as the place of the apposite action, Nishitani attempts to bring into 
view and deepen Hegel’s fundamental concern. Hegel’s concern lies in “raising the knowledge of the 
whole into the region of the ‘conceptual’ and reconstructing the structure contained in the factual into 
conceptual structure” (Nishitani 1988, Bd. 13, 53). This knowledge however is neither knowledge in 
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the sense of an everyday experience nor knowledge in the sense of scientifically objective knowledge. 
For Hegel the full concept (Begriff) is “the concrete and richest” (Hegel 1986: Bd. 6, 295) or the 
“concrete par excellence” (Hegel 1986: Bd.8, 307). In the concept/idea, which unfolds itself in the 
dialectic logic, concrete Dasein and universal logic interpenetrate, such that the cognition of the 
accordance of the concept/idea with the Dasein is the place of truth. This absolute knowledge is at the 
same time pure self-consciousness as the human I and the self-development of the Absolute, that is 
God himself. For Nishitani a fundamental question remains here: “How these sides are joined into one 
remains unaddressed. The connection of the human and the divine standpoints in knowledge remains 
fundamentally unelucidated” (Nishitani 1988, Bd. 13, 58 and following). For Nishitani, Hegel’s 
absolute thinking stays tethered to the standpoint of thinking, which although it unites the concrete 
and the universal in the thinking of thought, nevertheless does not return to the place of the “apposite 
act” and with that to the non-knowing knowledge. Non-knowing knowledge as the place of emptiness 
(Skrt: śūnyatā, Jap: kū, 空) is the always and ever bodily proof of the truth that does not adhere to any 
thinking.  
Śūnyatā is the place where each of us realizes his own reality, his thus-ness, as the concrete and whole 
human being that he is, which does not only include his personality, but also his body. At the same 
time it is the place where all things surrounding us realize themselves in their reality and thus-ness. 
(Nishitani 1982, 162) 
Nishitani aptly expresses this dimensional difference with a kōan: “Sitting on a hundred-meter high 
pole – to go one step forwards.”14 Said another way, this can be applied to Hegel’s philosophical place 
in the following way: the unity of being and thought captured thinkingly – to go one step forwards. 
This step pulls absolute thought into the difference of the place-of-the-here-and-now, through which 
absolute thought in its origin is concretely evidenced in and through the “apposite act.” The place of 
this origin is at the same time the place of non-knowing knowledge. The step over the top of the pole 
is the step from showing to actualizing, from absolute knowledge to non-knowing knowledge. 
In this way the place of non-knowing knowledge is the place of emerging and passing away that hides 
itself in origin.  
Absolute-nothing-at-once-absolute-being. In this sense it is the foundation of all negation and 
affirmation. In the place of the “simultaneously” (Japanese: soku, 即) is the absolute negation of the 
being of all being. It is the “thing” that lets all things be, or rather it is the “force” (chikara) that lets 
be. … The place of force is the place of the “simultaneously,” in which the absolute negation as such 
is the absolute affirmation. When we call this place of the “simultaneously” “emptiness” (Jpn: kū, 
Skrt: śūnyatā), then this place of emptiness is at the same time the place of knowledge. … Things are 
thing-“becoming” place (mon ga mono ni ‘natte iru’ ba場), and because they are becoming thing 
continually, they are also place. … In this place “being,” “becoming,” and “doing” are one. . . . Being, 
knowledge, and the act of knowing emerge originally in a place. This place is called “emptiness.” 
(Nishitani 1988, 93 and following) 
The entire structure of the world manifests itself as emptiness in every moment and in every place. 
This emptiness neither is nor is not, but is itself always evidenced in the apposite act. The nature of 
this act can be determined more closely: “On the field of emptiness all our activities take on the nature 
of play” (Nishitani 1982, 379 and following). “Work as well as play realize themselves originally and 
fundamentally as quite simply doing in what Buddhism calls ‘play’-samadhi (yugesanmai, 遊戯三昧, 
play-arising” (Nishitani 1982, 381). The philosophical tradition from the West is brought into view in 
a different and novel way from the “philosophy of emptiness,” and can thereby undergo a destruction. 






Indicating – Showing – Actualizing as Ways of Language Use in Philosophy 
So, it is a question neither of being nor of nothing. Derrida circles this inapparent (Unscheinbare) 
through words such as différance (difference and deferral of meaning), trace (trace), jeu (play), lieu 
(place). Nishida and Nishitani do the same with words such as pure experience (junsui keiken), place 
(basho, tokoro), absolute nothing (zettai mu), emptiness (ku). These fundamental words point to an 
inapparent (Unscheinbar) phenomenon. It is “inapparent” because a fundamental moment of this 
phenomenon is its own concealment in the self-manifestation. But if it is a phenomenon, then it 
belongs somehow to being. This shows a fundamental contradiction that both the Kyōto school 
thinkers as well as Derrida face. When that which is to be said falls outside of the question of the 
meaning of being, then it is not accessible in any way. Yet the meaning of being is never constituted 
without an “it.” So the reality of beings is simultaneously always also the appearance of the concealed 
and inapparent. In Buddhism this is condensed in a saying from the Heart-Sutra: “Appearance is 
simultaneously emptiness, emptiness is simultaneously appearance” (色即是空、空即是色) (Conze 
2001). Both Derrida and the Kyōto school thinkers show that such a radically non-given is not 
otherworldly, but that to open an entrance it is more a question of “going back beyond to this side of 
the origin.” 
How can one “go back beyond to this side of the origin”? Derrida and Nishitani both attempt it in 
their own way, from their own cultural background. In this, both wrestle in their own way with 
language. Derrida tries to provide writing or language with a play to escape from the thinking of 
presence and representation, from the European logocentrism and substantializing of truth. He comes 
from a tradition of language in which the spoken word in the sense of logos as the medium of truth is 
strongly foregrounded. Nishitani by contrast comes from a tradition of language in which the medium 
of language is considered inappropriate for the realization of truth. Zen Buddhism – which is an 
essential influence on Nishitani – particularly rejects any fixating verbalization with respect to the 
experience of becoming. Zen is, according to old Chinese sayings, a tradition independent of (holy) 
scriptures (furyū monji, 不立文字) which takes place immediately from heart-mind to heart-mind 
(ishin denshin, 以心伝心) and in which “the way of words is cut off” (gengo-dōdan, 言語同断).15 
That is to say, Nishitani comes from a tradition in which language is not understood from the outset as 
the real and almost exclusive medium of truth. He thus tries to make a pre-philosophical and pre-
predicative experience fertile for philosophy. So both discover something opposite. Derrida tries to 
evade the all-too-fixed logocentrism by playfully turning the place of difference into the place of his 
philosophy. But this continues to unfold itself as such in the medium of text and writing (écriture). 
Nishitani wants to open up a new dimension for the immediate experience in Zen Buddhism, by 
bringing Zen Buddhism and at the same time philosophy thinkingly into a dialogue. Both Derrida and 
Nishitani attempt the thinking proof. 
The term Actualization should be understood here in the strict sense. Three planes can be 
distinguished with regards to truth: indicating – showing – actualizing (Hinweisen – Aufweisen – 
Erweisen). These three ground-ways (Grundweisen) mark respectively different relations to truth. 
These relations can be thought in respectively different mediums, such as art, religion, and 
philosophy. In philosophy the medium of language is of paramount importance. How can we, in the 
region of language, determine more closely the differing relations to truth in indicating, showing, and 
proving? Indicating is connected to the old representational thought, in which the linguistic sign 
points to the substantial truth that is not itself given in the sign (Plato, Aristotle). Showing from within 
speaks from the thing itself, raises the verbally shown from within the horizon of experience into a 
general horizon of the true and is in this sense phenomenology (Hegel, Husserl, the early Heidegger). 
Actualizing allows the true to appear just here and now in the consummation of the pure movement as 
the happening apposite act, without attempting to determine it. It consists of the individual, bodily 
realization of truth in the place of the here-and-now. This Actualization can also take place verbally, 
whereby the actualized truth cannot be reified but should always again be newly produced and 
realized. Hereby the Actualization is essentially linked to practice, in which and with which the truth 
itself is actualized. 
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The Actualization is possible essentially as, or in, play. “Play” is not only an important notion in 
renowned representatives of Western philosophy (Heraclitus, Schiller, Nietzsche, the later 
Heidegger), but also plays a large role in East Asian thought (for example in Zhuangzi or in 
Buddhism, in the notion of yugesanmai, play-arising). In playing, one can attempt to think and act 
against the reification of truth. The “inapparent” (das Unscheinbare) that itself is neither being nor 
nothing shines only when something “comes into its play.” Play constitutes the disturbance of 
presence through the inapparent that itself does not appear. This inapparent is the invisible minimal 
that brings the whole into difference. 
Derrida avoids a merely formal conceptual criticism as he himself does not determine anything; his 
way of speaking is the play with texts. He brings texts “into play” and thereby into movement. This 
does not however mean that one cannot criticize Derrida, but in criticizing one must take care to hit 
upon the actual approach of Derrida’s thought. It seems to me that a good starting point for this lies in 
the different traditions of Asian thinking and experiencing. Taking up his way of play, Derrida’s texts 
and thoughts can themselves be put into play, and thereby new connections can appear in new playing 
fields. By bringing Derrida’s points into play in an Asian con-text, new traces can arise. It is not 
coincidental that both Derrida and Nishida (fifty years earlier) find a starting point in Plato’s position 
in the Timaeus. Both the Kyōto school thinkers and Derrida are concerned with something that for a 
long time could not become active in the philosophical tradition. In a strict sense the philosophical 
tradition can no longer be reduced to the West. But the difficult question arises as to why such a 
nearness emerges in two such distant places? On the one hand, we have Heidegger’s and recent 
French philosophy, on the other we have the Kyōto school and other Japanese ways of thought. On 
one side the tradition of European philosophy, on the other the Asian or East Asian tradition. The 
question of this nearness and its possibilities remains. In the extensive space between East and West 
so many playing fields remain undiscovered. 
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Notes 
* Translated by Steven Burik. Translator’s note: All translations of Nishida and Nishitani from the 
Japanese are Rolf Elberfeld’s unless otherwise specified. English translations have been checked 
against the original Japanese to ensure accuracy. This article was originally written in German. 
1 Translator’s note: Jacques Derrida’s “Comment ne pas Parler?” first appeared in French in 1987 in 
Psyche, Inventions de l’Autre. The English translation, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” appeared 
in 2008 in the second volume of Psyche, Inventions of the Other. 
2 Translator’s note: The German is kept here to indicate that “Vor-stellen” has the connotation “to put 
in front of oneself.” 
3 Translator’s note: Greek and French in original. 
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4 Παραδείγματος εϊδος. 
5 Μίμημα δέ παραδείγματος. 
6 Τρίτον γένος, 52a. 
7 Πάσης εϊναι γενέσεως ύποδοχήν αύτήν οϊον τιθήνην, 49a. 
8 Τό μέν γιγνόμενον, τό δ’ έν ώ γιγνεται, τό δ’ όθεν άφομοιούμενον φύεται τό γιγνόμενον, 50d. 
9 One can think here of A.N. Whitehead, who takes up this theme for the development of his 
cosmology in his intensive Timaeus-reception. Maaβen equates chora with the extensive continuum 
in Whitehead: “As in Plato with Whitehead you have the Chora (with Whitehead the extensive 
continuum)” (Maaβen 1991, 227). In our context it is noteworthy that Whitehead himself understands 
his philosophy to be closer to Asian thought than to Western thought: “In this [ultimate] general 
position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, 
thought, than to western Asiatic, or European thought” (Whitehead 1978, 7). Furthermore, Whitehead 
has frequently been compared to Asian thought, for example Odin (1983). 
10 Also see: Wohlfahrt (1991, 25) and following. 
11 Klaus Held points to this connection:  
This trait of spacing/space-giving (Raumgeben) of the world has in my opinion only been broached to 
some extent in the entire western tradition of thought once: Plato introduces in the Timaeus the notion 
of ‘chora’ as the most original yet hardly graspable precondition of the good order of appearance, that 
is of the ‘kosmos’ … . Understood as the happening of the recessive spacing/space-giving chora is 
essentially nothing else than that emptiness [in the sense of the East Asian Buddhist tradition, R. E.] 
that the world is. (1995, 117 and following, trans. Steven Burik) 
Held thus attempts to read the emptiness of the East Asian tradition through the idea of chora. 
12 See: Nishida (2012), Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitaro. 
13 Kōan 6 from the Mumonkan, the kōan-collection from the Chinese Zen Master Wu-men, 
http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/awakening101/mumonkan.html. 
14 Kōan 46 of the Mumonkan. The website 
http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/awakening101/mumonkan.html has a longer take on this kōan: 
“One who sits on top of the 100 foot pole has not quite attained true enlightenment. Make another step 
forward from the top of the pole and throw one’s own body into the 100,000 universes.” 
15 The sayings are attributed to Bodhidharma who came from India to China in the sixth century. 
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